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Network Working Group                                             L. Xia
Internet-Draft                                                  G. Zheng
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Huawei
Expires: July 29, 2018                                  January 25, 2018


  

specifications reviews model mobiles trending best hot Top Aw4qIBX

Abstract This document proposes one part of the security baseline YANG for network infrastructure device (i.e., router, switch, firewall, etc): data plane security baseline. The companion documents [I-D.ietf-lin- sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline], [I- D.ietf-dong-sacm-nid-infra- security-baseline] cover other parts of the security baseline YANG for network infrastructure device respectively: management plane security baseline, infrastructure layer security baseline. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on July 29, 2018. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 1]Using Fake Badges Trump Intimidation Voter Planned Loyalists Id FwqTR


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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     Voters Voters Pamphlet Voters Pamphlet ' ' ' Voters ' ' Pamphlet Voters Pamphlet HxCRrHa.  Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Security Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     Stories Alphacard Case Customer And Studies Success wwaUZqgX.  Security Baseline Data Model Design . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.4.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5Kakuyids Revolvy Kakuyids Revolvy Kakuyids Ttq0dxT6w
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     Scammers Driver Stop 's Illinois net Trying Idscan License To nZYqxU1T4w.  Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3Nitric Pubchem Hno3 Nitric Acid Acid XqdW1WpwDefinition By Of Satellite Merriam webster 76YUwPqwA.  Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Data Model Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Layer 2 protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  ARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     Fake Download Id India Apk Android Card For Maker zzSrHxa.  URPF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.  DHCP Snooping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.5.  CPU Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.6.  TCP/IP Attack Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  Network Infrastructure Device Security Baseline Yang Module .  22
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Photo Id kvjz Way The Worst And People Identification ' 'best Kuvo To OwOx8BqHr
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Photo Id kvjz Way The Worst And People Identification ' 'best Kuvo To OwOx8BqHr
   Athletics Guide College Publishing Service Official The Wrestling p8fCdwxIq8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Photo Id kvjz Way The Worst And People Identification ' 'best Kuvo To OwOx8BqHr
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Photo Id kvjz Way The Worst And People Identification ' 'best Kuvo To OwOx8BqHr
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Photo Id kvjz Way The Worst And People Identification ' 'best Kuvo To OwOx8BqHr
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Photo Id kvjz Way The Worst And People Identification ' 'best Kuvo To OwOx8BqHr

1. Introduction

1.1. Objective

Network security is an essential part of the overall network deployment and operation. Due to the following reasons, network infrastructure devices (e.g. switch, router, firewall) are always the objective and exploited by the network attackers, which bring damages to the victim network: o The existence of a lot of unsafe access channels: for the history reason, some old and unsafe protocols still run in the network devices, like: SNMP v1/v2, Telnet, etc, and are not mandatory to be replaced by the according safer protocols (SNMP v3, SSH). Attackers easily exploit them for attack (e.g., invalid login, message eavesdropping); Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 2]

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   o  The openness nature of TCP/IP network: despite the benefits of
      network architecutre design and connectivity brought by the
      network openness, a lot of threats exist at the same time.
      Spoofing address, security weakness for various protocols, traffic
      flooding, and other kinds of threat are originated from the
      network openness;

   o  The security challenge by the network complexity: network are
      becoming more complex, with massive nodes, various protocols and
      flexible topology.  Without careful design and strict management,
      as well as operation automation, the policy consistency of network
      security manangment cannot be ensured.  It's common that part of
      the network infrastructure is subject to attack;

   o  The complex functionality of device: the complexity of device
      itself increases the difficulty of carring out the security
      hardening measurements, as well as the skill requirements to the
      network administrator.  As a result, the network administrator may
      not be capable of or willing to realize all the security
      measurements, in addition to implementing the other basic
      functionalities;

   o  The capacity and capability mismatching between the data plane and
      the control plane: there are a large mismatching of the traffic
      processing capacity and capability between different planes.
      Without effective control, the large volume of traffic from the
      data plane will flooding attack the other planes easily.

   Therefore, the importance of ensuring the security of the network
   infrastructure devices is out of question.  To secure the network
   infrastructure devices, one important task is to identify as far as
   possible the threats and vulnerabilities in the device itself, such
   as: unnecessary services, insecure configurations, abnormal status,
   etc, then enforce the corresponding security hardening measurements,
   such as: update the patch, modify the security configuration, enhance
   the security mechanism, etc.  We call this task the developing and
   deploying the security baseline for the network infrastructure, which
   provides a solid foundation for the overall network security.  This
   document aims to describe the security baseline for the network
   infrastructure, which is called security baseline in short in this
   document.

1.2. Security Baseline

Basically, security baseline can be designed and deployed into different layers of the devices: Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 3]

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   o  application layer: refers to the application platform security
      solution and the typical application security mechanisms it
      provided like: identity authentication, access control, permission
      management, encryption and decryption, auditing and tracking,
      privacy protection, to ensure secure application data
      transmission/exchange, secure storage, secure processing, ensuring
      the secure operation of the application system.  Specific examples
      may be: web application security, software integrity protection,
      encryption of sensitive data, privacy protection, and lawful
      interception interfaces and secure third-party component;

   o  network layer: refers to a series of security measures, to protect
      the network resources and network services running on the device
      network platform.  Network layer security over network product is
      complicated.  Therefore, it is divided into data plane, control
      plane, management plane to consider:

      *  data plane: focus on the security hardening configuration and
         status to protect the data plane traffic against eavesdropping,
         tampering, forging and flooding attacking the network;

      *  control plane: focus on the control signaling security of the
         network infrastructure device, to protect their normal exchange
         against various attacks (i.e., eavesdropping, tampering,
         forging and flooding attack) and restrict the malicious control
         signaling, for ensuring the correct network topology and
         forwarding behavior;

      *  management plane: focus on the management information and
         platform security.  More specific, it includes all the security
         configuration and status involved in the network OAM process;

   o  infrastructure layer: refers to all the security design about the
      device itself and its running OS.  As the foundation of the upper
      layer services, the secure infrastructure layer must be assured.
      The specific mechanisms include: OS security, key management,
      cryptography security, certificate management, software integrity.

1.3. Security Baseline Data Model Design

The security baseline varies according to many factors, like: different device types (i.e., router, switch, firewall), the supporting security features of device, the specific security requirements of network operator. It's impossible to design a complete set for it, so this document and the companion ones are going to propose the most important and universal points of them. More baseline contents can be added in future following the data model scheme specified. Top specifications reviews trending model mobiles best hot Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 4]


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   [tableview uploaded org Http images nwprogressive www weblog BawqOv8] defines a method of
   constructing the YANG data model scheme for the security posture
   assessment of the network infrastructure device by brokering of YANG
   push telemetry via SACM statements.  The basic steps are:

   o  use YANG push mechanism[I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push]to collect the
      created streams of notifications (telemetry)
      [I-D.ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications]providing SACM content
      on SACM data plane, and the filter expressions used in the context
      of YANG subscriptions constitute SACM content that is imperative
      guidance consumed by SACM components on SACM management plane;

   o  then encapsulate the above YANG push output into a SACM Content
      Element envelope, which is again encapsulated in a SACM statement
      envelope;

   o  lastly, publish the SACM statement into a SACM domain via xmpp-
      grid publisher.

   In this document, we follow the same way as [I-D.ietf-birkholz-sacm-
   yang-content] to define the YANG output for network infrastructure
   device security baseline posture based on the SACM information model
   definition [I-D.ietf-sacm-information-model].

1.4. Summary

' Me 'i Stop Wsj Didn '; 't Robocalling xBwUqYzp The following contents propose part of the security baseline YANG output for network infrastructure device: data plane security baseline. The companion documents [I-D.ietf- dong-sacm-nid-cp- security-baseline], [I-D.ietf-lin-sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline], [I- D.ietf-xia-sacm-nid-app-infr-layers-security-baseline] cover other parts of the security baseline YANG output for network infrastructure device respectively: control plane security baseline, management plane security baseline, application layer and infrastructure layer security baseline.

2. Terminology

2.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 5]


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2.2. Definition of Terms

This document uses the terms defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-sacm- terminology].

3. Tree Diagrams

A simplified graphical representation of the data model is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as follows: o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys. o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write) and "ro" state data (read-only). o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node and "*" denotes a "list" and "leaf-list". o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":"). o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.

4. Data Model Structure

As the network infrastructure device, it makes decision of the forwarding path based on the IP/MAC address and sends the packet in data plane.The NP or ASIC are the main components for the data plane functions. This section describes the key data plane security baseline of the network infrastructure devices, and defines their specific data models.

4.1. Layer 2 protection

Mac table is the key resource in terms of layer 2 forwarding, also easily attacked by learning massive invalid mac address. The mac limit function is to protect the mac table by limiting the maximum number of learned mac address in appointed interfaces. The mac address is not learned and the packet is discarded when the up-limit is reached, and the alarm is created possibly. If the broadcast traffic is not suppressed in layer 2 network (i.e., Ethernet), a great amount of network bandwidth is consumed by a great deal of broadcast traffic. The network performance is degraded, even Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 6]


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   interrupting the communication.In such a case, configuring the
   broadcast traffic suppression on the device to ensure some bandwidth
   can be reserved for unicast traffic forwarding when broadcast traffic
   bursts across the network.It's flexible to configure the device to
   suppress broadcast, multicast, and unknown unicast traffic on an
   interface, a specified interface in a VLAN, a sub-interface, and over
   a virtual switch instance (VSI) pseudo wire (PW).

module: ietf-mac-limit
    +--rw mac
       +--rw macLimitRules
       |  +--rw macLimitRule* [ruleName]
       |     +--rw ruleName    string
       |     +--rw maximum     uint32
       |     +--rw rate?       uint16
       |     +--rw action?     macLimitForward
       |     +--rw alarm?      macEnableStatus
       +--rw vlanMacLimits
       |  +--rw vlanMacLimit* [vlanId]
       |     +--rw vlanId     macVlanId
       |     +--rw maximum    uint32
       |     +--rw rate?      uint16
       |     +--rw action?    macLimitForward
       |     +--rw alarm?     macEnableStatus
       +--rw vsiMacLimits
       |  +--rw vsiMacLimit* [vsiName]
       |     +--rw vsiName          string
       |     +--rw maximum          uint32
       |     +--rw rate?            uint16
       |     +--rw action?          macLimitForward
       |     +--rw alarm?           macEnableStatus
       +--rw bdMacLimits
       |  +--rw bdMacLimit* [bdId]
       |     +--rw bdId       uint32
       |     +--rw maximum    uint32
       |     +--rw rate?      uint16
       |     +--rw action?    macLimitForward
       |     +--rw alarm?     macEnableStatus
       +--rw pwMacLimits
       |  +--rw pwMacLimit* [vsiName pwName]
       |     +--rw vsiName    string
       |     +--rw pwName     string
       |     +--rw maximum    uint32
       |     +--rw rate?      uint16
       |     +--rw action?    macLimitForward
       |     +--rw alarm?     macEnableStatus
       +--rw ifMacLimits
       |  +--rw ifMacLimit* [ifName limitType]



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       |     +--rw ifName       pub-type:ifName
       |     +--rw limitType    limitType
       |     +--rw ruleName?    -> /mac/macLimitRules/macLimitRule/ruleName
       |     +--rw maximum      uint32
       |     +--rw rate?        uint16
       |     +--rw action?      macLimitForward
       |     +--rw alarm?       macEnableStatus
       +--rw ifVlanMacLimits
       |  +--ro ifVlanMacLimit* [ifName vlanBegin limitType]
       |     +--ro ifName       pub-type:ifName
       |     +--ro vlanBegin    macVlanId
       |     +--ro vlanEnd?     macVlanId
       |     +--ro limitType    limitType
       |     +--ro ruleName?    -> /mac/macLimitRules/macLimitRule/ruleName
       |     +--ro maximum      uint32
       |     +--ro rate         uint16
       |     +--ro action?      macLimitForward
       |     +--ro alarm?       macEnableStatus
       +--rw subifMacLimits
       |  +--rw subifMacLimit* [ifName limitType]
       |     +--rw ifName       pub-type:ifName
       |     +--rw limitType    limitType
       |     +--ro vsiName      string
       |     +--rw ruleName     string
       |     +--rw maximum      uint32
       |     +--rw rate?        uint16
       |     +--rw action?      macLimitForward
       |     +--rw alarm?       macEnableStatus
       +--rw vsiStormSupps
       |  +--rw vsiStormSupp* [vsiName suppressType]
       |     +--rw vsiName         string
       |     +--rw suppressType    suppressType
       |     +--rw percent?        uint64
       |     +--rw packets?        uint64
       |     +--rw cir?            uint64
       |     +--rw cbs?            uint64
       +--rw vlanStormSupps
       |  +--rw vlanStormSupp* [vlanId suppressType]
       |     +--rw vlanId          macVlanId
       |     +--rw suppressType    suppressType
       |     +--rw percent?        uint64
       |     +--rw packets?        uint64
       |     +--rw cir?            uint64
       |     +--rw cbs?            uint64
       +--rw pwSuppresss
       |  +--rw pwSuppress* [vsiName pwName suppressType]
       |     +--rw vsiName         string
       |     +--rw pwName          string



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       |     +--rw suppressType    suppressType
       |     +--rw percent?        uint64
       |     +--rw packets?        uint64
       |     +--rw cir?            uint64
       |     +--rw cbs?            uint64
       +--rw vsiTotalNumbers
       |  +--ro vsiTotalNumber* [vsiName slotId macType]
       |     +--ro vsiName    string
       |     +--ro slotId     string
       |     +--ro macType    macType
       |     +--ro number     uint32
       +--rw ifStormSupps
       |  +--rw ifStormSupp* [ifName suppressType]
       |     +--rw ifName          pub-type:ifName
       |     +--rw suppressType    suppressType
       |     +--rw direction       directionType
       |     +--rw percent?        uint64
       |     +--rw packets?        uint64
       |     +--rw cir?            uint64
       |     +--rw cbs?            uint64
       +--rw ifStormBlocks
       |  +--rw ifStormBlock* [ifName blockType direction]
       |     +--rw ifName       pub-type:ifName
       |     +--rw blockType    suppressType
       |     +--rw direction    directionType
       +--rw ifStormContrls
          +--rw ifStormContrl* [ifName]
             +--rw ifName                      pub-type:ifName
             +--rw action?                     stormCtrlActionType
             +--rw trapEnable?                 enableType
             +--rw logEnable?                  enableType
             +--rw interval?                   uint64
             +--rw ifPacketContrlAttributes
             |  +--rw ifPacketContrlAttribute* [packetType]
             |     +--rw packetType    stormCtrlType
             |     +--rw rateType?     stormCtrlRateType
             |     +--rw minRate       uint32
             |     +--rw maxRate       uint64
             +--rw ifstormContrlInfos
                +--ro ifstormContrlInfo* [packetType]
                   +--ro packetType        stormCtrlType
                   +--ro punishStatus?     stormCtrlActionType
                   +--ro lastPunishTime?   string








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4.2. ARP

ARP security is set of functions to protect the ARP protocol and networks against malicious attacks so that the network communication keeps stable and important user information is protected, which mainly includes: ARP anti-spoofing functions: protect devices against spoofing ARP attack packets, improving the security and reliability of network communication. ARP anti-flooding functions: relieve CPU load and prevent the ARP table overflow, ensuring normal network operation. Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 10]


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module: ietf-arp-sec
    +--ro arp-sec
       +--ro arpInterf aces
       |  +--rw arpInterface* [ifName]
       |     +--rw ifName                   -> /if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name
       |     +--rw arpLearnDisable?         boolean  //arp-learning-control
       |     +--rw arpLearnStrict?          arpStrictLearn  //arp-learning-control
       |     +--rw fakeExpireTime?          uint32   //arp-fake-expire-time?
       |     +--rw dstMacCheck?             boolean  //validate
       |     +--rw srcMacCheck?             boolean  //validate
       +--rw secArpGrats
       |  +--rw secArpGrat* [ifName]
       |     +--rw ifName    -> /if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name
       +--rw secArpChkIpEns
       |  +--rw secArpChkIpEn* [ifName]
       |     +--rw ifName    -> /if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name
       +--rw secArpMacIlls
       |  +--rw secArpMacIll* [ifName]
       |     +--rw ifName    -> /if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name
       +--rw secArpReqNoBlks
       |  +--rw secArpReqNoBlk* [ifName]
       |     +--rw ifName    -> /if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name
       +--ro secDisArpChks
       |  +--ro secDisArpChk* [secSlotId secChkType]
       |     +--ro secSlotId        -> /devm:devm/lpuBoards/lpuBoard/position
       |     +--ro secChkType       cpudefendArpAttackType
       |     +--ro secTotalPkts?    uint64
       |     +--ro secPassedPkts?   uint64
       |     +--ro secDropedPkts?   uint64
       +--ro arpIfLimits //arp-table-limit
       |  +--rw arpIfLimit* [ifName vlanId]
       |     +--rw ifName        -> /if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name
       |     +--rw vlanId        uint16
       |     +--rw limitNum      uint32
       |     +--ro learnedNum?   uint32
       +--ro arpSpeedLimits  // arp-speed-limit
       |  +--rw arpSpeedLimit* [slotId suppressType ipType]
       |     +--rw slotId           string
       |     +--rw suppressType     enumeration
       |     +--rw ipType           enumeration
       |     +--rw suppressValue    uint32
       +--ro arpGlobalSpeedLimits  // arp-speed-limit
          +--rw arpGSpeedLimit* [gSuppressType gIpType]
             +--rw gSuppressType     arpSuppType
             +--rw gIpType           arpSuppIpType
             +--rw gPortType?        enumeration
             +--rw gSuppressValue    uint32




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4.3. URPF

Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (URPF) is a technology used to defend against network attacks based on source address spoofing. Generally, upon receiving a packet, a router first obtains the destination IP address of the packet and then searches the forwarding table for a route to the destination address. If the router finds such a route, it forwards the packet; otherwise, it discards the packet. A URPF- enabled router, however, obtains the source IP address of a received packet and searches for a route to the source address. If the router fails to find the route, it considers that the source address is a forged one and discards the packet. In this manner, URPF can effectively protect against malicious attacks that are launched by changing the source addresses of packets. URPF can be performed in strict or loose mode. The strict mode checks both the existence of source address in the route table and the interface consistency, while loose mode only checks if the source address is in the route table. In some case, the router may have only one default route to the router of the ISP. Therefore, matching the default route entry needs to be supported. URPF can be performed over interface, defined flow and traffic sent to local CPU. module: ietf-urpf-sec +--ro urpf-sec +--rw interface-urpf* [ifname] | +--rw ifname if:interface-ref | +--rw mode? enumeration | +--rw allow-default? boolean augment "/policy:policies/policy:policy-entry" + | "/policy:classifier-entry" + | "/policy:classifier-action-entry-cfg": +--rw (action-cfg-params)? | +--:(urpf) | +--rw urpf-cfg | +--rw check-type? urpf-check-type | +--rw allow-default? Boolean +--rw local-URPF +--rw cpu-defend-policy* [name] +--rw name string +--description? string +-- urpf-mode enumeration +--allow-default boolean +--slot-id unit16 Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 12]


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        Identity urpf  {
          base policy:action-type;
          description
            " urpf action type";
        }

   grouping urpf {
          container urpf-cfg {
            leaf check-type {
              type urpf-check-type;
              description
                "urpf checking";
            }
   leaf allow-default{
   type qos-switch-flag;
   description    " allowDefault  flag";
   }
            description
              "urpf container";
          }
          description
            "dscp marking grouping";
        }



   augment "/policy:policies" +
                "/policy:policy-entry" +
                "/policy:classifier-entry" +
                "/policy:classifier-action-entry-cfg" +
                "/diffserv:action-cfg-params" {
   case urpf {
              uses sec-ac:urpf;
            description
              "urpf action";
          }
   }


4.4. DHCP Snooping

DHCP, which is widely used on networks, dynamically assigns IP addresses to clients and manages configuration information in a centralized manner. During DHCP packet forwarding, some attacks may occur, such as bogus DHCP server attacks, DHCP exhaustion attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and DHCP flooding attacks. Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 13]
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   DHCP snooping is a DHCP security feature that functions in a similar
   way to a firewall between DHCP clients and servers.  A DHCP-snooping-
   capable device intercepts DHCP packets and uses information carried
   in the packets to create a DHCP snooping binding table.  This table
   records hosts' MAC addresses, IP addresses, IP address lease time,
   VLAN, and interface information.  The device uses this table to check
   the validity of received DHCP packets.  If a DHCP packet does not
   match any entry in this table, the device discards the packet.

   Besides the binding table, DHCP snooping has other security features
   such as trusted interface, max dhcp user limit and whitelist to
   defend against the bogus DHCP server, DHCP flooding and other fine-
   grained DHCP attacks.

module: ietf-dhcp-sec
    +--rw dhcp
       +--rw snooping
          +--rw dhcpSnpGlobal
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpEnable?                   boolean
          |  +--rw serverDetectEnable?              boolean
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpUserBindAutoSaveEnable?   boolean
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpUserBindFileName?         string
          |  +--rw globalCheckRateEnable?           boolean
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpGlobalRate?               uint16
          |  +--rw checkRateAlarmEnable?            boolean
          |  +--rw rateThreshold?                   uint16
          |  +--rw alarmThreshold?                  uint16
          |  +--ro rateLimitPacketCount?            uint32
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpUserOfflineRemoveMac?     boolean
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpArpDetectEnable?          boolean
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpGlobalMaxUser?            uint16
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpUserTransferEnable?       boolean
          +--rw dhcpSnpVlans
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpVlan* [vlanId]
          |     +--rw vlanId                     uint16
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpEnable              boolean
          |     +--rw checkRateEnable            boolean
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpVlanRate            uint32
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpVlanTrustEnable     boolean
          |     +--rw checkArpEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpThreshold          uint16
          |     +--rw checkIpEnable              boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpEnable              boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpThreshold           uint16
          |     +--rw alarmReplyEnable           boolean
          |     +--rw alarmReplyThreshold        uint16
          |     +--rw checkMacEnable             boolean



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          |     +--rw alarmMacEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmMacThreshold          uint16
          |     +--rw checkUserBindEnable        boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserBindEnable        boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserBindThreshold     uint16
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpVlanMaxUserNum      uint16
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitEnable       boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitThreshold    uint16
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpVlanStatistics
          |        +--ro dropArpPktCnt?              uint32
          |        +--ro dropIpPktCnt?               uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReqCntByBindTbl?    uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReqCntByMacCheck?   uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReplyCnt?           uint32
          +--rw vlanTrustInterfaces
          |  +--rw vlanTrustInterface* [vlanId ifName]
          |     +--rw vlanId    uint16
          |     +--rw ifName    pub-type:ifName
          +--rw dhcpSnpInterfaces
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpInterface* [ifName]
          |     +--rw ifName                          pub-type:ifName
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpEnable                   boolean
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpIfDisable                boolean
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpIfTrustEnable            boolean
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpIfRate                   uint16
          |     +--rw checkRateEnable                 boolean
          |     +--rw alarmRateEnable                 boolean
          |     +--rw alarmRateThreshold              uint16
          |     +--rw checkArpEnable                  boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpEnable                  boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpThreshold               uint16
          |     +--rw checkIpEnable                   boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpEnable                   boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpThreshold                uint16
          |     +--rw alarmReplyEnable                boolean
          |     +--rw alarmReplyThreshold             uint16
          |     +--rw checkMacEnable                  boolean
          |     +--rw alarmMacEnable                  boolean
          |     +--rw alarmMacThreshold               uint16
          |     +--rw checkUserBindEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserBindEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserBindThreshold          uint16
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpIntfMaxUserNum           uint32
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitEnable            boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitThreshold         uint16
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpInterfStickyMacEnable    boolean
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpIfStatistics
          |        +--ro dropArpPktCnt?              uint32



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          |        +--ro dropIpPktCnt?               uint32
          |        +--ro pktCntDropByUserBind?       uint32
          |        +--ro pktCntDropByMac?            uint32
          |        +--ro pktCntDropByUntrustReply?   uint32
          |        +--ro pktCntDropByRate?           uint32
          +--rw dhcpSnpDynBindTbls
          |  +--ro dhcpSnpDynBindTbl* [ipAddress outerVlan innerVlan vsiName vpnName bridgeDomain]
          |     +--ro ipAddress       pub-type:ipv4Address
          |     +--ro outerVlan       uint16
          |     +--ro innerVlan       uint16
          |     +--ro vsiName         string
          |     +--ro vpnName         string
          |     +--ro bridgeDomain    uint32
          |     +--ro macAddress?     pub-type:macAddress
          |     +--ro ifName?         pub-type:ifName
          |     +--ro lease?          yang:date-and-time
          +--rw dhcpSnpVlanIfs
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpVlanIf* [vlanId ifName]
          |     +--rw vlanId                     uint16
          |     +--rw ifName                     pub-type:ifName
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpEnable              boolean
          |     +--rw trustFlag                  boolean
          |     +--rw checkArpEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpThreshold          uint32
          |     +--rw checkIpEnable              boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpEnable              boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpThreshold           uint32
          |     +--rw alarmReplyEnable           boolean
          |     +--rw alarmReplyThreshold        uint32
          |     +--rw checkChaddrEnable          boolean
          |     +--rw alarmChaddrEnable          boolean
          |     +--rw alarmChaddrThreshold       uint32
          |     +--rw checkReqEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmReqEnable             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmReqThreshold          uint32
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpVlanIfMaxUserNum    uint32
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitEnable       boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitThreshold    uint32
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpVlanIfStatistics
          |        +--ro dropArpPktCnt?              uint32
          |        +--ro dropIpPktCnt?               uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReqCntByBindTbl?    uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReqCntByMacCheck?   uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReplyCnt?           uint32
          +--rw ifStaticBindTbls
          |  +--rw ifStaticBindTbl* [ifName ipAddress vlanId ceVlanId]
          |     +--rw ifName        pub-type:ifName



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          |     +--rw ipAddress     pub-type:ipAddress
          |     +--rw vlanId        uint16
          |     +--rw ceVlanId      uint16
          |     +--rw macAddress?   pub-type:macAddress
          +--rw vlanStaticBindTbls
          |  +--rw vlanStaticBindTbl* [vlanId ipAddress ceVlanId]
          |     +--rw vlanId        uint16
          |     +--rw ipAddress     pub-type:ipAddress
          |     +--rw ceVlanId      uint16
          |     +--rw macAddress?   pub-type:macAddress
          |     +--rw ifName?       pub-type:ifName
          +--rw dhcpSnpBds
          |  +--rw dhcpSnpBd* [bdId]
          |     +--rw bdId                       uint32
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpEnable?             boolean
          |     +--rw dhcpSnpTrust?              boolean
          |     +--rw checkArpEnable?            boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpEnable?            boolean
          |     +--rw alarmArpThreshold?         uint32
          |     +--rw checkIpEnable?             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpEnable?             boolean
          |     +--rw alarmIpThreshold?          uint32
          |     +--rw alarmReplyEnable?          boolean
          |     +--rw alarmReplyThreshold?       uint32
          |     +--rw checkMacEnable?            boolean
          |     +--rw alarmMacEnable?            boolean
          |     +--rw alarmMacThreshold?         uint32
          |     +--rw checkRequestEnable?        boolean
          |     +--rw alarmRequestEnable?        boolean
          |     +--rw alarmRequestThreshold?     uint32
          |     +--rw maxUserNum?                uint32
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitEnable?      boolean
          |     +--rw alarmUserLimitThreshold?   uint32
          |     +--rw statistics
          |        +--ro dropArpPktCnt?              uint32
          |        +--ro dropIpPktCnt?               uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReqCntByBindTbl?    uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReqCntByMacCheck?   uint32
          |        +--ro dropDhcpReplyCnt?           uint32
          +--rw BdStaticBindTbls
          |  +--rw globalBdStaticBindTbl* [bdId ipAddress peVlan ceVlan]
          |     +--rw bdId          uint32
          |     +--rw ipAddress     pub-type:ipv4Address
          |     +--rw macAddress?   pub-type:macAddress
          |     +--rw peVlan        uint16
          |     +--rw ceVlan        uint16
           +--rw dhcpSnpWhiteLists
             +--rw dhcpSnpWhiteList* [whtLstName]



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                +--rw whtLstName           string
                +--rw applyFlag            boolean
                +--rw dhcpSnpWhiteRules
                   +--rw dhcpSnpWhiteRule* [ruleId]
                      +--rw ruleId     uint16
                      +--rw srcIP?     inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
                      +--rw srcMask?   inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
                      +--rw dstIP?     inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
                      +--rw dstMask?   inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
                      +--rw srcPort?   dhcpSnpPort
                      +--rw dstPort?   dhcpSnpPort

4.5. CPU Protection

For the network device, there are maybe a large number of packets to be sent to its CPU, or malicious packets attempt to attack the device CPU. If the CPU receives excessive packets, it will be overloaded and support the normal services with very poor performance; In extreme cases, the system fails. More specifically, services are negatively affected when the CPU is attacked because of the following reasons: o Valid protocol packets are not distinguished from invalid protocol packets. The CPU is busy in processing a large number of invalid protocol packets. Consequently, the CPU usage rises sharply and valid packets cannot be processed properly o Packets of some protocols are sent to the CPU through the same channel. When excessive packets of a certain type of protocol packet block the channel, the transmission of other protocol packets is affected o The bandwidth of a channel is not set appropriately. When an attack occurs, processing of protocol packets on other channels is affected Accordingly, the following countermeasures can be taken by the network device for CPU protection: o Collect and classify protocols related to various services running on equipment o Use ACLs to filter the packets. Valid protocol packets are put into the whitelist and a user-defined flow, other packets are put into the blacklist Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 18]


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   o  Plan the priorities, channel bandwidth, length of packets, and
      alarm function of the preceding three lists

   o  Disable services that are not deployed on the equipment, and
      control the total forwarding bandwidth

   In this manner, the number of packets sent to the CPU is under
   control, and the bandwidth is ensured preferentially for services
   with higher priorities.  In addition, CPU overload is prevented and
   an alarm is generated when an attack occurs.

module: ietf-cpuDefend
    +--rw cpuDefend
       +--rw cpuDefendPolicys
       |  +--rw cpuDefendPolicy* [policyID]
       |     +--rw policyID        uint32
       |     +--rw description?    string
       |     +--rw whiteListACLNumber?   uint32
       |     +--rw blackListACLNumber?   uint32
       |     +--rw userDefinedFlows
       |     |  +--rw userDefinedFlow* [flowID]
       |     |     +--rw flowID   uint32
       |     |     +--rw aclNumber      uint32
       |     +--rw cpuDefendRules
       |        +--rw cpuDefendRule* [ruleType pktIndex userDefinedFlowID protocolName tcpIpName]
       |           +--rw ruleType           cpuDefendRuleType  // [total-packet | whitelist | blacklist | use-defined-flow | protocolName | TcpIpType]
       |           +--rw pktIndex?          uint16
       |           +--rw userDefinedFlowID? uint32
       |           +--rw protocolName?      protocolType // [ftpServer | sshServer | snmp | ... | NA]
       |           +--rw tcpIpName?         tcpIPType // [TCPSYN | FRAGMENT | NA]
       |           +--rw CARAttr
       |           |  +--rw cir?        uint32
       |           |  +--rw cbs?        uint32
       |           |  +--rw pir?        uint32
       |           |  +--rw pbs?        uint32
       |           |  +--rw minPktLen?      uint32
       |           |  +--rw pktRate?        uint32
       |           |  +--rw weight?         uint16
       |           +--rw priority?          priorityEnum //{ high | middle | low | be | af1 | af2 | af3 | af4 | ef | cs6 }
       |           +--rw alarmDropRate
       |              +--rw enable          boolean
       |              +--rw threshold?      uint32
       |              +--rw interval?       uint16
       |              +--rw speedThreshold? uint32
       +--rw cpuDefendPolicyCfgs
       |  +--rw cpuDefendPolicyCfg* [slotIdStr]
       |     +--rw slotIdStr    -> /devm:devm/lpuBoards/lpuBoard/position
       |     +--rw policyID     -> /cpudefend/cpuDefendPolicys/cpuDefendPolicy/policyID



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       +--ro displayCARsConfs
       |  +--ro displayCARsConf* [slotId pktIndex]
       |     +--ro slotId       string
       |     +--ro pktIndex     uint16
       |     +--ro cir?         uint32
       |     +--ro cbs?         uint32
       |     +--ro minPkt?      uint32
       |     +--ro priority?    priorityEnum
       |     +--ro desc?        protocolType
       +--ro protocolStats
       |  +--ro protocolStat* [slotId]
       |     +--ro slotId             string
       |     +--ro protocolEnable     protocolType //{ftpServer | sshServer | snmp | ...}
       |     +--ro defaultAct         protocolEnableDefAction  // {Drop | Min_to_cpu}
       |     +--ro defaultCir         uint32
       |     +--ro defaultCbs         uint32
       +--ro secnoncarstats
       |  +--ro secnoncarstat* [secSlotId secPolicyType secPolicyTypeID]
       |     +--ro secSlotId          string
       |     +--ro secPolicyType      cpudefendNoCarPolicyType
       |     +--ro secPolicyTypeID    cpudefendSecStatTypeID
       |     +--ro secSubTotalPkts?   uint64
       |     +--ro secSubPassPkts?    uint64
       |     +--ro secSubDropPkts?    uint64
       +--ro seccarstats
       |  +--ro seccarstat* [secSlotId secPolicyType secPolicyTypeID]
       |     +--ro secSlotId          string
       |     +--ro secPolicyType      cpudefendPolicyType
       |     +--ro secPolicyTypeID    uint32
       |     +--ro secAppEnable?      boolean
       |     +--ro secAppDefAct?      cpudefendAppDefAction
       |     +--ro secProtoEnable?    boolean
       |     +--ro secPassedPkts?     uint64
       |     +--ro secDropedPkts?     uint64
       |     +--ro secCfgCir?         uint32
       |     +--ro secCfgCbs?         uint32
       |     +--ro secActualCir?      uint32
       |     +--ro secActualCbs?      uint32
       |     +--ro secPriority?       cpudefendPriority
       |     +--ro secMinPktLen?      uint32
       |     +--ro secAclDenyPkts?    uint64
       |     +--ro secHistPps?        uint64
       |     +--ro secHistPpsTime?    yang:date-and-time
       |     +--ro secLastPps?        uint64
       |     +--ro secLastDrpBTime?   yang:date-and-time
       |     +--ro secLastDrpETime?   yang:date-and-time
       |     +--ro secTtlDropPkts?    uint64
       +--ro totalPktStats



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       |  +--ro totalPktStat* [slotId]
       |     +--ro slotId        string
       |     +--ro totalPkt?     uint64
       |     +--ro passPkt?      uint64
       |     +--ro dropPkt?      uint64
       +--rw hostcarNodes
       |  +--rw hostcarNode* [slotID hostCarType]
       |     +--rw slotID         -> /devm:devm/lpuBoards/lpuBoard/position
       |     +--rw hostCarType    hostCarTypeEnum  // {hostcar | http-hostcar | vlan-host-car}
       |     +--rw ifEnable?      socIfEnable
       |     +--rw cir?           uint32
       |     +--rw pir?           uint32
       |     +--rw cbs?           uint32
       |     +--rw pbs?           uint32
       |     +--rw dropThreshold?   uint32
       |     +--rw interval?        uint32
       +--ro hostCarStats
       |  +--ro hostCarStat* [slotID hostCarType statType hostCarID httpHostCarID vlanHostCarID]
       |     +--ro slotID           -> /devm:devm/lpuBoards/lpuBoard/position
       |     +--ro hostCarType      hostCarTypeEnum
       |     +--ro statType         statTypeEnum // {carID | all | auto-adjust | dropped | non-dropped | active}
       |     +--ro hostCarID        uint32
       |     +--ro httpHostCarID    uint32
       |     +--ro vlanHostCarID    uint32
       |     +--ro passedBytes?     uint64
       |     +--ro droppedBytes?    uint64
       +--ro hostCarCfgs
          +--ro hostCarCfg* [slotID]
             +--ro slotID       string
             +--ro hostCarType?    hostCarTypeEnum
             +--ro defaultCir?     uint32
             +--ro defaultPir?     uint32
             +--ro defaultCbs?     uint32
             +--ro defaultPbs?     uint32
             +--ro actualCir?      uint32
             +--ro actualPir?      uint32
             +--ro actualCbs?      uint32
             +--ro actualPbs?      uint32
             +--ro droprateEn?     ifEnable
             +--ro logInterval?    uint32
             +--ro logThreshold?   uint32


4.6. TCP/IP Attack Defence

Defense against TCP/IP attacks is applied to the router on the edge of the network or other routers that are easily to be attacked by illegal TCP/IP packets. Defense against TCP/IP attacks can protect Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 21]

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   the CPU of the router against malformed packets, fragmented packets,
   TCP SYN packets, and UDP packets, ensuring that normal services can
   be processed.

   module: ietf-tcp-ip-attack-defence
   +--rw secAntiAttackEnable
          |  +--rw antiEnable?        antiAttackEnableCfgType
          |  +--rw abnormalEnable?    antiAttackEnableCfgType
          |  +--rw udpFloodEnable?    antiAttackEnableCfgType
          |  +--rw tcpSynEnable?      antiAttackEnableCfgType
          |  +--rw icmpFloodEnable?   antiAttackEnableCfgType
          |  +--rw fragmentEnable?    antiAttackEnableCfgType
          +--rw secAntiAttackCarCfg
          |  +--rw cirFlag?   uint32
          |  +--rw cirIcmp?   uint32
          |  +--rw cirTcp?    uint32
          +--rw secAntiAttackStats
          |  +--ro secAntiAttackStat* [attackType]
          |     +--ro attackType    antiAttackType
          |     +--ro totalCount?   uint64
          |     +--ro dropCount?    uint64
          |     +--ro passCount?    uint64

5. Network Infrastructure Device Security Baseline Yang Module

module ietf-mac-limit { namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mac-limit"; prefix maclimit; /* import huawei-pub-type { prefix pub-type; } */ import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } /* import huawei-extension { prefix ext; } include huawei-mac-action; include huawei-mac-type; */ organization "Huawei Technologies."; contact "Liang Xia: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com"; Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 22]


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    "Guangying Zheng: Zhengguangying@huawei.com";
  description
    "MAC address limit.";

  revision 2017-09-01 {
    description
      "Init revision";
    reference "xxx.";
  }

  container mac {
    description
      "MAC address forwarding. ";
    container macLimitRules {
      description
        "Global MAC address learning limit rule.";
      list macLimitRule {
        key "ruleName";
        description
          "Global MAC address learning limit.";
        leaf ruleName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "Global MAC address learning limit rule name.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..131072";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {
            range "0..1000";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned.";
        }
        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";
          description
            "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";



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        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";
        }
      }
    }
    container vlanMacLimits {
      description
        "VLAN MAC address limit list.";
      list vlanMacLimit {
        key "vlanId";
        description
          "VLAN MAC address limit.";
        leaf vlanId {
          type macVlanId;
          description
            "VLAN ID.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..130048";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a VLAN.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {
            range "0..1000";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a VLAN.";
        }
        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";
          description
            "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VLAN.";
        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VLAN.";



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        }
      }
    }
    container vsiMacLimits {
      description
        "VSI MAC address limit list.";
      list vsiMacLimit {
        key "vsiName";
        description
          "VSI MAC address limit.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..524288";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a VSI.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {
            range "0..1000";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a VSI.";
        }
        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";
          description
            "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VSI.";
        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "disable";
          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VSI.";
        }
        leaf upThreshold {
          type uint8 {
            range "80..100";



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          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Upper limit for the number of MAC addresses.";
        }
        leaf downThreshold {
          type uint8 {
            range "60..100";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Upper limit for the number of MAC addresses.";
        }
      }
    }
    container bdMacLimits {
      description
        "BD MAC address limit list.";
      list bdMacLimit {
        key "bdId";
        description
          "BD MAC address limit.";
        leaf bdId {
          type uint32 {
            range "1..16777215";
          }
          description
            "Specifies the ID of a bridge domain.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..130048";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a BD.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {
            range "0..1000";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a BD.";
        }
        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";



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          description
            "Forward or discard the packet.";
        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";
        }
      }
    }
    container pwMacLimits {
      description
        "PW MAC address limit list.";
      list pwMacLimit {
        key "vsiName pwName";
        description
          "PW MAC address limit.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf pwName {
          type string {
            length "1..15";
          }
          description
            "PW name.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..130048";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a PW.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {
            range "0..1000";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a PW.";
        }



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        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";
          description
            "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a PW.";
        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a PW.";
        }
      }
    }
    container ifMacLimits {
      description
        "Interface MAC address limit list.";
      list ifMacLimit {
        key "ifName limitType";
        description
          "Interface MAC address limit.";
        leaf ifName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Interface name.";
        }
        leaf limitType {
          type limitType;
          description
            "Interface MAC limit type.";
        }
        leaf ruleName {
          type leafref {
            path "/mac/macLimitRules/macLimitRule/ruleName";
          }
          description
            "Rule name.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..131072";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned on an interface.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {



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            range "0..1000";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "Interval (ms) at which MAC addresses are learned on an interface.";
        }
        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";
          description
            "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on an interface";
        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on an interface.";
        }
      }
    }
    container ifVlanMacLimits {
      description
        "Interface + VLAN MAC address limit list.";
      list ifVlanMacLimit {
        key "ifName vlanBegin limitType";
        config false;
        description
          "Interface + VLAN MAC address limit.";
        leaf ifName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Name of an interface. ";
        }
        leaf vlanBegin {
          type macVlanId;
          description
            "Start VLAN ID.";
        }
        leaf vlanEnd {
          type macVlanId;
          description
            "End VLAN ID.";
        }
        leaf limitType {
          type limitType;
          description
            "Interface MAC limit type.";
        }



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        leaf ruleName {
          type leafref {
            path "/mac/macLimitRules/macLimitRule/ruleName";
          }
          description
            "Rule name.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..131072";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned on an interface.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {
            range "0..1000";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Interval (ms) at which MAC addresses are learned on an interface.";
        }
        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";
          description
            "Discard or forward the packet.";
        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";
        }
      }
    }
    container subifMacLimits {
      description
        "Sub-interface MAC address limit list.";
      list subifMacLimit {
        key "ifName limitType";
        description
          "Sub-interface MAC address limit.";
        leaf ifName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Name of a sub-interface. ";



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        }
        leaf limitType {
          type limitType;
          description
            "Sub-interface MAC limit type.";
        }
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..36";
          }
          config false;
          mandatory true;
          description
            "VSI name , EVPN name or bridge domain ID.";
        }
        leaf ruleName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Rule name.";
        }
        leaf maximum {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..131072";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned on a sub-interface.";
        }
        leaf rate {
          type uint16 {
            range "0..1000";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "Interval (ms) at which MAC addresses are learned on a sub-interface.";
        }
        leaf action {
          type macLimitForward;
          default "discard";
          description
            "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on a sub-interface.";
        }
        leaf alarm {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";



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          description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on a sub-interface.";
        }
      }
    }
    container vsiStormSupps {
      description
        "VSI Suppression List.";
      list vsiStormSupp {
        key "vsiName suppressType";
        description
          "VSI Suppression.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf suppressType {
          type suppressType;
          description
            "Traffic suppression type.";
        }
        leaf cir {
          type uint64 {
            range "0..4294967295";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "CIR value.";
        }
        leaf cbs {
          type uint64 {
            range "0..4294967295";
          }
          description
            "CBS value.";
        }
      }
    }
    container vlanStormSupps {
      description
        "VLAN Suppression List.";
      list vlanStormSupp {
        key "vlanId suppressType";
        description
          "VLAN Suppression.";



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        leaf vlanId {
          type macVlanId;
          description
            "VLAN ID.";
        }
        leaf suppressType {
          type suppressType;
          description
            "Traffic suppression type.";
        }
        leaf cir {
          type uint64 {
            range "64..4294967295";
          }
          default "64";
          description
            "CIR value.";
        }
        leaf cbs {
          type uint64 {
            range "10000..4294967295";
          }
          description
            "CBS value.";
        }
      }
    }
    container subIfSuppresss {
      description
        "Sub-interface traffic suppression list.";
      list subIfSuppress {
        key "ifName suppressType direction";
        description
          "Sub-Interface traffic suppression.";
        leaf ifName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Sub-interface name.";
        }
        leaf suppressType {
          type suppressType;
          description
            "Suppression type.";
        }
        leaf direction {
          type directionType;
          description
            "Suppression direction.";



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        }
        leaf cir {
          type uint64 {
            range "0..4294967295";
          }
          default "0";
          description
            "CIR value.";
        }
        leaf cbs {
          type uint64 {
            range "0..4294967295";
          }
          description
            "CBS value.";
        }
      }
    }
    container pwSuppresss {
      description
        "PW traffic suppress list.";
      list pwSuppress {
        key "vsiName pwName suppressType";
        description
          "PW traffic suppression.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf pwName {
          type string {
            length "1..15";
          }
          description
            "PW name.";
        }
        leaf suppressType {
          type suppressType;
          description
            "Traffic suppression type.";
        }
        leaf cir {
          type uint64 {
            range "100..4294967295";
          }



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          default "100";
          description
            "CIR value.";
        }
        leaf cbs {
          type uint64 {
            range "100..4294967295";
          }
          description
            "CBS value.";
        }
      }
    }
    container pwSuppressPtns {
      description
        "PW traffic suppress list.";
      list pwSuppressPtn {
        key "vsiName peerIp pwId pwEncap";
        description
          "PW traffic suppression.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf peerIp {
          type string {
            length "0..255";
            pattern "((([1-9]?[0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])\\.){3}([1-9]?[0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5]))";
          }
          description
            "Peer IP address.";
        }
        leaf pwId {
          type uint32 {
            range "1..4294967295";
          }
          description
            "PW ID.";
        }
        leaf pwEncap {
          type macPwEncapType;
          description
            "PW encapsulation type.";
        }
        leaf isEnable {



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          type boolean;
          default "true";
          description
            "Enable status.";
        }
        leaf suppressType {
          type suppressStyle;
          default "absoluteValue";
          description
            "Traffic suppression type.";
        }
        leaf broadcast {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..200000000";
          }
          default "1000";
          description
            "Broadcast suppression (kbit/s)";
        }
        leaf unicast {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..200000000";
          }
          default "1000";
          description
            "Unknown unicast suppression (kbit/s).";
        }
        leaf multicast {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..200000000";
          }
          default "1000";
          description
            "Multicast suppression (kbit/s).";
        }
      }
    }
    container vsiInSuppressions {
      description
        "VSI inbound traffic suppression list.";
      list vsiInSuppression {
        key "vsiName";
        description
          "VSI inbound traffic suppression.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }



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          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf inboundSupp {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Inbound suppression.";
        }
      }
    }
    container vsiOutSuppressions {
      description
        "VSI outbound traffic suppression list.";
      list vsiOutSuppression {
        key "vsiName";
        description
          "VSI outbound traffic suppression.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf outboundSupp {
          type macEnableStatus;
          default "enable";
          description
            "Outbound suppression.";
        }
      }
    }
    container vsiSuppresss {
      description
        "VSI traffic suppression list.";
      list vsiSuppress {
        key "subIfName";
        description
          "VSI traffic suppression.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }



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        leaf subIfName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Sub-interface name.";
        }
        leaf isEnable {
          type boolean;
          default "true";
          description
            "Enable status.";
        }
        leaf suppressType {
          type suppressStyle;
          default "percent";
          description
            "Traffic suppression type.";
        }
        leaf broadcast {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..200000000";
          }
          default "64";
          description
            "Broadcast suppression (kbit/s)";
        }
        leaf broadcastPercent {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..100";
          }
          default "1";
          description
            "Broadcast suppression.";
        }
        leaf unicast {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..200000000";
          }
          default "64";
          description
            "Unknown unicast suppression (kbit/s).";
        }
        leaf unicastPercent {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..100";
          }
          default "1";
          description
            "Unknown unicast suppression.";



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        }
        leaf multicast {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..200000000";
          }
          default "64";
          description
            "Multicast suppression (kbit/s).";
        }
        leaf multicastPercent {
          type uint32 {
            range "0..100";
          }
          default "1";
          description
            "Multicast suppression.";
        }
      }
    }
    container vsiTotalNumbers {
      description
        "List of MAC address total numbers in a VSI.";
      list vsiTotalNumber {
        key "vsiName slotId macType";
        config false;
        description
          "Total number of MAC addresses in a VSI.";
        leaf vsiName {
          type string {
            length "1..31";
          }
          description
            "VSI name.";
        }
        leaf slotId {
          type string {
            length "1..24";
          }
          description
            "Slot ID.";
        }
        leaf macType {
          type macType;
          description
            "MAC address type.";
        }
        leaf number {
          type uint32;



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          mandatory true;
          description
            "Number of MAC addresses.";
        }
      }
    }
    container ifStormSupps {
      description
        "Interface traffic suppression list.";
      list ifStormSupp {
        key "ifName suppressType";
        description
          "Interface traffic suppression.";
        leaf ifName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Name of an interface. ";
        }
        leaf suppressType {
          type suppressType;
          description
            "Suppression type.";
        }
        leaf percent {
          type uint64 {
            range "0..99";
          }
          description
            "Percent.";
        }
        leaf packets {
          type uint64 {
            range "0..148810000";
          }
          description
            "Packets per second.";
        }
        leaf cir {
          type uint64 {
            range "0..100000000";
          }
          description
            "CIR(Kbit/s).";
        }
        leaf cbs {
          type uint64 {
            range "10000..4294967295";
          }



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          description
            "CBS(Bytes).";
        }
      }
    }
    container ifStormBlocks {
      description
        "Interface traffic block list.";
      list ifStormBlock {
        key "ifName blockType direction";
        description
          "Interface traffic suppression.";
        leaf ifName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Name of an interface. ";
        }
        leaf blockType {
          type suppressType;
          description
            "Block type.";
        }
        leaf direction {
          type directionType;
          description
            "Direction.";
        }
      }
    }
    container ifStormContrls {
      description
        "Interface storm control list.";
      list ifStormContrl {
        key "ifName";
        description
          "Interface storm control.";
        leaf ifName {
          type pub-type:ifName;
          description
            "Name of an interface. ";
        }
        leaf action {
          type stormCtrlActionType;
          default "normal";
          description
            "Action type.";
        }
        leaf trapEnable {



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          type enableType;
          default "disable";
          description
            "Trap state.";
        }
        leaf logEnable {
          type enableType;
          default "disable";
          description
            "Log state.";
        }
        leaf interval {
          type uint64 {
            range "1..180";
          }
          default "5";
          description
            "Detect interval.";
        }
        container ifPacketContrlAttributes {
          description
            "Storm control rate list.";
          list ifPacketContrlAttribute {
            key "packetType";
            description
              "Storm control rate.";
            leaf packetType {
              type stormCtrlType;
              description
                "Packet type.";
            }
            leaf rateType {
              type stormCtrlRateType;
              default "pps";
              description
                "Storm control rate type.";
            }
            leaf minRate {
              type uint32 {
                range "1..148810000";
              }
              mandatory true;
              description
                "Storm control min rate.";
            }
            leaf maxRate {
              type uint64 {
                range "1..148810000";



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              }
              mandatory true;
              description
                "Storm control max rate.";
            }
          }
        }
        container ifstormContrlInfos {
          description
            "Storm control info list.";
          list ifstormContrlInfo {
            key "packetType";
            config false;
            description
              "Storm control info";
            leaf packetType {
              type stormCtrlType;
              description
                "Packet type.";
            }
            leaf punishStatus {
              type stormCtrlActionType;
              description
                "Storm control status.";
            }
            leaf lastPunishTime {
              type string {
                length "1..50";
              }
              description
                "Last punish time.";
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA. Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC. Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 43]


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7. Security Considerations

To be added.

8. Acknowledgements

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, A Need About Refurbished Buying Iphones Everything You To Know 8WAHw, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

9.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications] Voit, E., Clemm, A., Prieto, A., Nilsen-Nygaard, E., and A. Tripathy, "Custom Subscription to Event Streams", draft-ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications-08 (work in progress), December 2017. [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push] Clemm, A., Voit, E., Prieto, A., Tripathy, A., Nilsen- Nygaard, E., Bierman, A., and B. Lengyel, "YANG Datastore Subscription", draft-ietf-netconf-yang-push-12 (work in progress), December 2017. [I-D.ietf-sacm-information-model] Waltermire, D., Watson, K., Kahn, C., Lorenzin, L., Cokus, M., Haynes, D., and H. Birkholz, "SACM Information Model", draft-ietf-sacm-information-model-10 (work in progress), April 2017. Authors' Addresses Liang Xia Huawei Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com Guangying Zheng Huawei Email: zhengguangying@huawei.com Xia & Zheng Expires July 29, 2018 [Page 44]

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